Energy: Coal Gasification--A Source of Energy by Bates, Gloria
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 1 
1-1-1981 
Energy: Coal Gasification--A Source of Energy 
Gloria Bates 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gloria Bates, Energy: Coal Gasification--A Source of Energy, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 128 (1981), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss1/18 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
128 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
presumption in favor of joint custody where the parents agree upon such an
arrangement.87
In the absence of such action by the Oklahoma legislature, however, it
is incumbent upon the divorce attorney to inform his client of all available
options, including joint custody. Admittedly, joint custody is not feasible in
many situations. If, however, the divorcing parents fulfill the required
criteria for a successful joint custody arrangement, such an award can be a
beneficial and workable solution to the child custody problem.
S. Elaine Murphree
Energy: Coal Gasification-A Source of Energyt
I. Introduction
"Energy" is a buzz word, or at least the term calls forth the projected
shortages thereof. The demand for energy is increasing, while supplies of oil
and natural gas are diminishing.' Currently the United States depends on oil
and gas for about 75 percent of its energy needs. 2 The domestic supply of
both of these fuels is dwindling, however, and may be exhausted early in the
twenty-first century.3 Because of combustion systems already in place, oil
and gas are likely to remain essential energy fuels for at least the next thirty
years. 4
This nation's growing dependence on imported oil made it vulnerable to
international, political, and economic pressures-such as those exerted by the
OPEC oil embargo in 1973-and reduced its freedom in foreign and
domestic policy making.5 While the declared aim of American policy is to
the marriage, and for the visitation rights of the parent or parents not having custody of such
children as it may deem just and proper."
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1980) provides in subsection (b): "The court may
give the care and custody of such children to the parties jointly if the parties so agree and if the
court finds that a joint custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child or
children. Joint custody under this paragraph means that both parties have equal rights and
responsibilities to the minor child and neither party's rights are superior."
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1980): "Joint custody is in the best interests of
a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody. .. ."
"This paper is one of two papers awarded the Eugene 0. Kuntz Scholarship for 1981,
presented by H.B. Watson, Jr., Partner, Watson, McKenzie & Moricoli, Oklahoma City.-Ed.
I A. McRAE & J. DUDAS, THE ENERGY SOURcE BOOK 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
McRAE & DUDAS].
2 Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL:
STATUS AND OUTLOOK OF COAL GAsIFICATION AND LIQUEFACFION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL].
McRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 237.
SYNrTiEc FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2.
McRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 689.
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reduce the use of imported oil, the United States has in fact become more
and more dependent upon it.6 Between 1973 and early 1979, the United
States' oil imports almost doubled, increasing to seven to nine million barrels
per day (mbd) of oil, or about half of our total oil consumption.7
Three overriding energy objectives for the United States have been iden-
tified: (1) an immediate objective to reduce dependence on foreign oil and
vulnerability to supply interruptions; (2) in the mid-term, to keep the United
States' imports sufficiently low to weather the period when world oil produc-
tion approaches its capacity limitation; and (3) in the long term, to have
renewable and essentially inexhaustible sources of energy for sustained
economic growth.' Government policy makers recognize the problem and are
trying to ensure the nation's commitment to the early development of energy
alternatives. There are many alternatives that can be pursued, and each is ac-
companied by technical, economic, environmental, and social problems. 9
Coal constitutes almost 90 percent of United States conventional energy
reserves, but it supplied only 18 percent of energy consumption in 1977.10
Mineable amounts of coal equivalent to nearly 350 years' supply at the 1979
rate of coal production have been estimated." Given coal's abundance,
widespread distribution, relative ease of access, chemical versatility, and cur-
rent need, its increased use is readily apparent.' 2 In the search for develop-
ment of alternative energy sources, the United States has renewed its interest
in developing the technology that will permit rapid commercialization of pro-
cesses for converting coal to low-, medium-, and high-BTU gas.' 3 The extrac-
tion of methane from coal has been demonstrated in several pilot plants,
both in the United States and abroad."' Because of the uniquely efficient and
clean inherent attributes of methane (the product of high-BTU coal gasifica-
tion 5 and the main component of natural gas), as well as of the I million-
mile continental United States gas delivery system in place,'" 6 this process of-
fers the nation a mid-term capability to make greater use of coal reserves to
supplement domestic natural gas supplies."'
6 R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STOBAUGH & YERGIN].
7Environmental Implications of the Synthetic Fuels Industry, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV.
391 (1980).
MCRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 4.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 39.
R. GREENE & J. GALLAGHER, FUTURE COAL PROSPECTS-COUNTRY AND REGIONAL
ASSESSMENTS 455 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GREENE & GALLAGHER].
12 1 J. MORSE & D. HEBB, COLORADO ENERGY RESOURCES HANDBOOK, COAL 40 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as MORSE & HEBB].
I McRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 311.
"4 Id. at 185.
"1 SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 20.
'6 Zimmer & Schellhardt, Relationship of the FUA to Other Alternate Fuel Policies, in
COAL CONVERSION AND ALTERNATE FUELS SELECTION: PRACTICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 272
(R. Winkler ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COAL CONVERSION].




The constraints on any commercialization of high-BTU coal gasifica-
tion include a variety of federal and state practices and policies. These prac-
tices and policies influence (1) the siting and approval or certification of the
plant; (2) the construction and initial (or short-term) operation; and (3) the
long-term operation.' 8
First Phase. The siting of proposed energy facilities, especially projects
in which federal or Indian lands are involved, has been especially difficult for
industry participants. The existing federal regulatory and permitting process
is complicated and extensive. In addition to the federal system, there is an ar-
ray of required state and local permits and regulatory requirements. To date,
no major high-BTU synfuels project has successfully completed the federal
regulatory process, even after many years of lengthy legal deliberations.' 9
Second Phase. Once a plant has been sited and approved, construction
and then initial operation follows. In view of the huge costs involved, it is
understandable that the industry would want to construct its projects accord-
ing to specified and final environmental regulations. However, some environ-
mental standards for synfuel plants remain incompletely specified and sub-
ject to change.20
Third Phase. Because of the huge capital costs, high-BTU coal gas
plants would have to operate at a profit for many years to realize a return on
investment and to pay back all debts. Industry is concerned that long-term
operation might be adversely affected if environmental regulations became
more stringent during the course of a project's life.2
Although synthetic fuels may not be economic in the short-term future,
they may become more competitive as the supply of petroleum and natural
gas diminishes. Moreover, it is also desirable for the United States to build
them on a major scale for reasons of national security and political in-
dependence in world affairs. A synthetic fuel industry is, therefore, an in-
tegral part of achieving self-sufficiency in. energy. 2
The growth of a large synfuels industry is projected to be a gradual and
difficult process, requiring the completion of many industry and governmen-
tal actions. 'Either industry or the federal government, or some combination
thereof, must commit the billions of dollars required to construct commercial
size plants. Large new mines would have to be opened to supply coal for
these synfuels complexes. To allow industry to proceed with its plans,
federal, state, and local governments would have to issue the necessary per-
mits and approvals. For example, the federal government would have to issue
specific environmental standards and appropriate economic regulatory deci-
sions.23 The technology for initial synfuels producton is available. Several im-
11 SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 35.
19 Id.
10 Id. at 36.
21 Id.
22 McRAx & DuDAS, supra note 1, at 433.
23 SYNTHEnc FuELs FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 190.
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proved processes may be technologically ready for the marketplace before
1985. Many of the environmental problems of commercialization can be con-
trolled, but much remains to be learned. The costs of constructing and
operating many synfuels plants would indeed be large; the costs of not hav-
ing the synfuels option, however, could be even larger.
24
II. Coal Gasification in Great Britain
The modem coal industry began in Great Britain. 25 The relative
richness in coal resources and the accelerated exploitation of coal was respon-
sible for Britain's rise to industrial preeminence in the nineteenth century;
thus, coal and the coal industry came to have a special place" in the British
economy.
26
At the end of World War II coal supplied more than 90 percent of the
primary fuel requirements of the United Kingdom.2 7 By 1966, however, coal
was no longer the unchallenged source of power, and postwar developments
in the energy industries largely revolved around a changing, and generally
diminishing, role of coal.28 The gas supply industry of Britain, for long the
dominant secondary energy industry, was overtaken as a coal consumer by
the electricity supply industry in 1940. However, throughout the first quarter
of the century, when gas was the main source of domestic and municipal il-
lumination, as well as the major alternative source other than coal for
heating, the gas works of Britain consumed coal at more than twice the rate
of electricity generating stations. From 1940 to 1955 coal consumption for
gas making rose by 56 percent to a maximum 27.9 million tons. After 1955,
the gas industry used less coal each year, whereas electricity generating sta-
tions markedly increased their coal consumption and by 1962 were consum-
ing almost three times as much coal as the gas works.2 9
The gas industry grew in piecemeal fashion during the nineteenth cen-
tury, with each town having its own gas works and its own separate and local
systems of gas mains for distribution. The first coal-fired gas company,
which distributed its product for lighting, was chartered in London in 1812.30
In 1949, when the gas industry was nationalized, there were in existence 991
gas undertakings, of which 269 belonged to local authorities. The plants that
used coal produced low-pressure gas and, as a by-product, the bulky but
valuable coke. In the years following nationalization, dramatic changes took
place in the distribution of gas making. This was because of a number of fac-
tors, among them changes in the sources of raw materials, in the technology
" Id. at 196.
W . ROGERS, THE COAL PRIMER 19 (1978).
26 E. SIMPSON, COAL AND THE POWER INDUSTRIES IN POSTWAR BRITAIN Xvii (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SIMPSON].
" Id. at 2.
28 Id. at xvii.
29 Id. at 87.
0 McRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 311.
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of gas making and gas distribution, and, of no small importance, in the ad-
ministration of the industry as it has developed under public ownership. As
some indication of the magnitude of these changes, it may be noted that
compared with the 1,050 separate gas works in existence upon nationalization
of the industry in May, 1949, by March, 1963, there were only 307 works,
though the :otal installed capacity had risen by 26 percent over that in ex-
istence in 1950. Furthermore, new gas mains were constructed at an average
rate of some 2,150 miles per year from the early 1950's and by 1964 an in-
tricate series of regional gas grids had been established. 3 '
Coal gasification has been practiced since the late eighteenth century,
largely for the manufacture of either a town gas supply of intermediate
energy content, or a synthesis gas for processing to ammonia or methanol."
The German Lurgi process for the complete gasification of coal had been in-
troduced in Britain on a commercial scale by 1960, and research designed to
increase the efficiency of this method was carried on. The Lurgi process is a
noncarbonization process that can use low-grade coals. The first part of the
first Lurgi plant in Britain came into operation at Westfield in Fife in
December, 1960. This works has been supplied by an adjacent open-cast coal
mine under a twenty-year contract between the National Coal Board and the
Scottish Gas Board. A second Lurgi plant was constructed at Coleshill in
Warwickshire."
The mwufacture of secondary fuels from coal was a major industrial
activity until the abundant availability of petroleum turned attention to the
manufacture of equivalent materials from the more easily manipulated fluid
raw material. This movement particularly affected the gas industries of many
countries, including Britain, and the amount of fuel gas made from coal
markedly declined. 34 North Sea gas production has also had a direct effect on
the consumption of gas and hence competing fuels because all of the gas is
consumed in the UK. The changeover from town gas has been both rapid and
total, resulting in a 260 percent increase in gas demand between 1970 and
1978 with a stagnant total energy demand.3"
When natural gas supplies from the North Sea begin to dwindle, there
will be several possibilities available to supply energy to Great Britain, in-
cluding (1) increased imports from Norway, (2) increased direct burning of
coal, and (3) synthetic natural gas (SNG) manufactured from coal. SNG, in
particular, would seem a promising long-term option and it is receiving
substantial research and development effort. 6 SNG can be regarded as a
future attractive option for coal because the existing transmission system is
" SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 129.
31 E. GCODGER, ALTERNATIVE FUELS-CHEMICAL ENERGY RESOURCES 153 (1980).
"' SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 96.
34 J. MACRAE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF FUEL 82 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MACRAE].
" GREEN & GALLAGHER, supra note 11, at 374.
36 Id. at 390.
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available for use, the same network of mains that facilitated the rapid expan-
sion of natural gas consumption in the early seventies. However, given the
need to develop techniques and the considerable cost advantage of coal over
oil and gas that is required to make conversion economically viable, and
although it is important as a sign of things to come, this market is not seen as
a major market for coal in Britain before the end of the century.
3
Participants from the United Kingdom in the World Coal Study found
that the UK, in common with the rest of the world, faces the prospect of
seeking to maintain economic growth against a background of increasingly
limited oil supplies. 3 They predict the UK coal industry, which has seen the
decline of the sixties leveled off in the seventies, will grow until about the
year 2000 to help meet a growing demand for energy as indigenous supplies
of oil and gas diminish and imports are increasingly difficult to obtain. 39 The
coal industry in the United Kingdom is a statutory government undertaking
operated by the National Coal Board. In 1980 the United Kingdom was near-
ly self-sufficient in coal, exporting and importing a few million tons each
year. Security of energy supply has been a major factor in determining na-
tional coal policy."0 With a large resource base of coal, the UK is well placed
to expand coal production."' Two decades of declining demand for coal,
from the mid-fifties to the early seventies, led to an industry starved of in-
vestment and badly in need of new capacity. After the oil crisis in 1973-74,
the Plan for Coal was launched to achieve higher capacity and productivity
through a program of exploration, investment, and research and develop-
ment.4 2 The UK participants in the World Coal Study also pointed out that
all this must be accomplished in an environmentally responsible manner, the
impacts of coal being weighed against those of other fuels and the cost of
controlling the impacts being set against the benefits achieved."3
The principal legislation controlling atmospheric pollution in Great Bri-
tain is the Alkali, etc., Works Regulation Act of 1906 and the Clean Air Acts
of 1956 and 1968. The 1936 Public Health Act and the 1974 Control of
Pollution and Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act also contain provisions
dealing with the matter.
44
III. Early Coal Gasification in the United States
The first gas company in the United States was chartered in Baltimore,
Maryland, in 1816."1 It sold synthetic gas produced from coal. The organiza-
, Id. at 391.
, Id. at 370.
" Id. at 372.
, C. WILSON, COAL-BRIDGE TO THE FuTURE 127 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WILSON].
41 GREEN & GALLAGHER, supra note 11, at 369.
42 Id. at 369-70.
"' Id. at 370.
44 Id. at 413.
4, McRAE & DUDAS, supra note 1, at 311.
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tion of similar companies in other cities followed in the next two decades.
The business of all these companies represented the practical application of
the discovery by a seventeenth-century Belgian chemist that coal could be
burned in a way to yield a flammable gaseous substance."
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gas from coal was pro-
duced in the United States and Europe to serve a variety of needs, such as for
lighting, cooking, and industrial purposes.47 The first large-scale use of
manufactured gas in the early nineteenth century in America was for street
lighting. Large-scale use of gas for cooking did not occur until late in the
nineteenth century."8 Nearly every major city in the eastern United States had
a coal gas plant and the accompanying cylindrical storage tanks that stood
near them. 9 The systems gradually disappeared after World War II as low-
cost natural. gas began to be distributed nationally by pipeline."0 The develop-
ment of central electric generating stations contributed to a further loss in the
markets for manufactured gas. s '
After coal gas lost its markets in the United States, coal gasification
technologies were further advanced abroad. In Europe the Lurgi process, in
which coal is gasified with oxygen and steam, was developed in the 1930's and
used to produce "city gas" for local distribution.1
2
IV. Importance of Coal to the United States
Coal--America's most abundant fossil fuel-powered the country's
shift from an agrarian to an industrialized society in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries." Coal's golden era occurred in the first two
decades of the twentieth century when output rose steadily, and coal ac-
counted for 67% of the United States' energy consumption.14 With the ap-
pearance of cheap and convenient oil and natural gas shortly after World
War II, coal experienced a dramatic decline in key markets. By 1978 coal ac-
counted for less than 20% of total United States energy consumption,"s while
in 1950 it netted 34% of the total United States energy demand,56 a reduction
from the 47.9% of 1947.
57
In 1970, some 111 years after the birth of the American oil industry,
46 STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 59.
4, SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 18.
, STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 59.
" SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 18.
s Id.
" STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 59.
RZ SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 18.
, STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 79.
14 W. MEAD & A. UTrON, U.S. ENERGY POLICY: ERRORS OF THE PAST, PROPOSALS FOR
THE FUTuRE 59 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MEAD & UTrON].
, STOAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 79.
" R. NOYES, COAL RESOURCES, CHARACTERISTICS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE U.S.A. 2
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOYES].
s, MEAD & UTTON, supra note 54, at 59.
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domestic production of oil peaked and began to decline. The demand for oil
continued to surge, however, and that demand could be met only by more
and more oil from the Middle East, which meant increasing dependence and
increasing vulnerability." That same year, Wilson M. Laird, Director of Of-
rice of Oil and Gas of the Department of Interior said: "We are rapidly pass-
ing from a phase of energy abundance to one of energy scarcity. The gap
between domestic supply and demand is now widening so rapidly that not
even the indicated production from the North Slope will be enough to restore
our position of self-sufficiency in petroleum energy." 5 9
The fist oil embargo, in late 1973 and early 1974, definitely marked the
end of the era of secure, cheap oil." The international oil cartel quadrupled
the pzice of crude oil; in addition, the Arab nations within the cartel tem-
porarily withheld oil shipments to the United States. These actions-one
economic, the other political-made it difficult to ignore for any longer the
unpleasant facts about United States domestic oil supply. The nation's proved
oil reserves and production had, indeed, been declining since 1970. The na-
tion had relied increasingly upon oil imports to fill the gap between dwindl-
ing domestic oil supply and growing domestic consumption."
Marin 0. Young, vice-president and general counsel of Peabody Coal
Company, stated in February of 1974:
The current energy crisis should come as no surprise to anyone
wiing to look at facts. It is the direct result of deliberate national
policies extending back for many years which inexorably led to the pres-
ent shortage of fuels. These policies include the regulation of natural
gas prices at the wellhead, air pollution regulations which banned the
use of coal, unrealistically low fuel prices which encouraged careless use
and waste, unrestricted oil imports, environmentally inspired delays of
all kinds, and many others.6
2
The oil embargo, sharply higher oil prices, and concern for future
energy supplies have contributed to renewed interest in coal as a major
energy supplier." Coal represents 88% of the total proven United States fuel
reserves, including oil shale, uranium, petroleum, and natural gas. The
United States has nearly 68% of the free world's coal." The demonstrated




SS STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 3.
"ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE-NATURAL RESOURCES LAW SEC., THE ENERGY CRISIS AND
THE LAWYER 46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY CRISIS].
'0 STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 4.
6, NOYES, supra note56, at 1.
62 ENERGY CRISIS, supra note 59, at 46.
63 MEAD & UTTON, supra note 54, at 60.
6 ENERGY CRISIS, supra note 59, at 48.
62 GREEN & GALLAGHER, supra note 11, at 455.
1981]
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By the mid-1970s, after much work had revitalized the coal industry
and increased its contribution to national energy self-sufficiency, coal's
potential began to be rediscovered. Research and development expenditures
to develop coal gasification and liquefaction techniques and to control
sulphur oxide emissions were expected to be more than $400 million in 1975
and to amount to nearly $3 billion by 1980.6 One 1974 prediction indicated
that after 1980 "the development of conversion industries using coal to pro-
duce clean gaseous, liquids, and solid fuels will move coal into the position as
cornerstone of our energy self-sufficiency.' '67
The concept of producing a clean gaseous fuel from coal is not a new
one. The engineer of the early 1900s made use of a deep, fixed-bed of hot
coal to produce a clean fuel gas." Commercialization of synthetic fuels (syn-
fuels) technology poses many opportunities and problems. The processing of
coal into environmentally clean synfuels would supplement the nation's
dwindling reserves of oil and natural gas and help to reduce the nation's de-
pendence on imported fuels. 69 First generation gasification and liquefaction
technology is proven but would currently produce synfuels at prices signifi-
cantly higher than conventional fuels. In addition to the problem of eco-
nomic feasibility, the emerging synfuels industry is constrained by the
technical uncertainties of advanced processes, a complicated and as yet
undefined system of federal, state, and local regulatory permits and stan-
dards, and potentially severe environmental impacts.
70
Greatly expanded use of coal will require a change in public attitude
toward coal, a fuel which for the better part of this century was steadily
displaced by oil and gas to gain greater convenience, lower cost, and cleaner
environment."
V. Current Technology of Coal Gasification
The principal use of coal is as a fuel available for combustion with little
preparatory treatment. Important secondary fuels are made from coal by
various well-established techniques. Secondary fuels in gaseous form are pro-
duced by gasification. ' 2 Coal gasification is a chemical technology in which
pulverized coal is converted into combustible gas, which may be of low-,
medium-, or high-BTU content per cubic foot (gases can be characterized by
their heat content measured in BTUs per cubic foot of gas)." The BTU, or
66 ENERGY CRISIS, supra note 59, at 15.
67 Id.
63 J. WHITE & R. SPRAGUE, SYMPOSIUM PAPERS: EFFICIENT USE OF FUELS IN THE
METALLURGICAL INDUSTRIES 167 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SPRAGUE].
11 SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 1.
70 Id.
71 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY-ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, STEAM COAL: PROSPECTS TO 2000, at 95 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STEAM
COAL].
72 MACRAE, supra note 34, at 82.
71 SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 17.
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British thermal unit, is the amount of heat required to raise the temperature




The first development in coal conversion took place more than a cen-
tury ago in Europe with the production of a crude "town gas," a low-BTU
gas from coal or coke ovens," for industrial and domestic use. 76 In its
earliest form-introduced in Britain circa 1860 by Sir William Siemens-coal
gasification resulted in the generation of a producer gas, mainly a mixture of
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen, by incomplete combustion
of coal in air." The first commercially feasible conversion, however, was the
Lurgi process, developed in Germany in 1936.78 The product from the Lurgi
process can be upgraded into high-BTU gas. 79 The Lurgi gasifier, the best
known of the low-BTU gasifiers presently available, is currently being used
industrially in very large gasification plants in South Africa.80 The Lurgi and
Koppers-Totzek gasifiers are currently the most widely used commercially in
the production of high-BTU gas with both systems presently in operation in
South Africa on a large commercial scale.8" At the Sasol plant in South
Africa, motor fuel components and chemicals are being produced commer-
cially from coal-derived gas.
82
In the 1960s, as it became evident that the nation's reserves of natural
gas and oil were being depleted, the government began to turn its attention to
coal as a potential source of fuel. This resulted in the establishment of the
Office of Coal Research (OCR) in the Bureau of Mines. Through efforts on
the part of OCR and private industry,8 3 new technologies to gasify coal into
useful energy products have been advanced and tested.8 4 Several pilot plants
that can produce synthetic gas are in operation, under construction, or have
been completed. Pilot plants in operation are located in West Virginia, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania (2). Operational gasifiers in industry are located in
Pennsylvania, Minnesota (2), Kentucky, and Tennessee."5
Three kinds of coal gas systems are currently being considered for com-
mercial development:
1. High-BTU gas, referred to as substitute natural gas (SNG), which
has a heating value of about 1,000 BTU/cubic foot;
" MORSE & HEBB, supra note 12, at 47.
" S. BRIDGES, IMPORTING FUELS AND PETROCHEMICAL RAW MATERIALS FOR TEXAS 43
(1975) [hereinafter cited as BRIDGES].
76 STEAM COAL, supra note 71, at 74.
, M. TOMLINSON, CHEMISTRY FOR ENERGY 12 (1979).
" BRIDGES, supra note 75, at 43.
, SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 1.
SO STEAM COAL, supra note 71, at 75.
41 Id.
11 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COAL AS AN ENERGY RESOURCE-CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS 243 (1977) [hereinafer cited as COAL As AN ENERGY RESOURCE].
91 BRIDGES, supra note 75, at 43.





2. Medium- or intermediate-BTU gas, which has a heating value of
300 to 600 BTU/cubic foot;
3. Low-BTU gas, which has a heating value of about 150 BTU/cubic
foot. 6
High-BTU coal gasification is the production of pipeline quality gas
from coal. The product gas, mostly methane, has a heating value nearly
equivalent to natural gas and may be distributed through existing pipeline
systems to the user.8 7 Thus, high-BTU gas from coal offers the potential to
supplement natural gas supplies by using abundant domestic coal reserves."
Moreover, depending on the particular technology employed, high-BTU coal
gasification processes produce a variety of by-products. These include am-
monia, sulfur, coke, and liquified petroleum gas.89
Commercial production of medium- and high-BTU gas is generally not
yet cost competitive with alternative energy supplies, although active develop-
ment effort is underway in several countries with the objective of reducing
the cost and improving plant reliability. One such process that is probably
developed farthest toward commercial realization is the British Gas Corpora-
tion/Lurgi gasifier in Westfield, Scotland.90
One approach of utilizing coal with a minimum insult to the environ-
ment is to gasify coal with a mixture of air or oxygen and steam to produce a
fuel gas with a heating value in the range of 150-300 BTU/CF.9' The low-
BTU gas is then easily cleaned to remove sulphur and other objectionable
materials, thus making the subsequent combustion of the flammable fuel gas
a cleaner process capable of meeting requisite environmental standards. The
clean fuel gas produced simplifies the design of combustors or boilers, and it
can be easily transported. Yet another advantage gained by gasifying (rather
than directly burning coal in a utility boiler) is that some of the current
gasifier designs permit the use of a wide range of coal quality and types, thus
expanding the fuel markets considerably.92 An additional and significant ad-
vantage of low-BTU gas over natural gas and coke oven gas is that it can be
heated to high temperatures without cracking and carbon deposition. 3
It is important to point out that low-BTU gas is suitable for use as an
energy source only near its point of production because its low heat content
makes it uneconomical to store or to transmit over long distances, that is,
farther than one or two miles.94 Coal would have to be shipped to gasifica-
tion sites.98 Generating the sulfur-free, clean-burning fuel gas from coal on
IO d. at 19.
" Id. at 20.
Id.
29 Id.
, SMAM COAL, supra note 71, at 76.
" WurrE & SPRAGUE, supra note 68, at 167.
92 STEAM COAL, supra note 71, at 76.
'3 WnrrE & SPRAGUE, supra note 68, at 206.
SST.AM COAL, supra note 71, at 74.
SYHETIC FUELs FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 33.
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the site of consumption results in a maximum utilization of all available
energy from the generating plant. A low-BTU gasification plant can be incor-
porated into a large chemical or metallurgical complex to supply a broad
energy mix consisting of fuel gas, electric power, and steam. Thus, the low-
BTU gasification plant may be considered as a total energy system. "Total
energy" means that all the various forms of energy requirements of an in-
dustrial complex can be supplied through the use of low-BTU gas generated
from a single source of energy-coal.
9 6
The WD/GI Gasification process (also used in low-BTU gas plants) has
been in operation for thirty years as an industrial fuel gas generator, and the
gasifier was used for twenty years before that in a cyclic process. This process
is regarded throughout Europe, South Africa, and Australia as the leader in
the field because of its efficiency, reliability, absence of pollution, and high
gas quality. Some one hundred units have been successfully built and
operated. The WD/GI process can make an immediate and significant con-
tribution to solving our current energy crisis.97
The metallurgical industries in particular face a serious economic loss
should supplies of clean, supplementary fuel for furnace and process equip-
ment firing be curtailed. On-site generation of clean fuel gas from coal offers
a reliable solution to this crisis and can make a significant contribution to the
onward growth of our industrial economy. Most important, it is a solution
that is independent of the whims of foreign governments. 8
V. United States Government Policies
The federal government's interest in synthetic fuel (synfuel) began as
far back as 1944, when a comprehensive synthetic fuel program was under-
taken by the Department of the Interior under the O'Mahoney-Randolph
Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944. 99 Demonstration plants were constructed
and operated to produce synthetic liquid fuels from coal and other
substances, in order to conserve and increase the oil resources of the United
States.' 0 The sponsor of the bill, Senator O'Mahoney, predicted that
without such a program the United States would become an importer of
petroleum and thus would be dependent on foreign producers for the fuel
supply needed to maintain the commercial and industrial leadership America
now enjoys.1° '
The Senate National Fuels and Energy Study Group of the 87th Con-
gress, on September 21, 1962, identified "the role of government-sponsored
96 WHITE & SPRAGUE supra note 68, at 167.
I7 d. at 210.
8 Id. at 204.
09 O'Mahoney-Randolph Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-290, 58
Stat. 190 (1944).






research in the fuels and energy industries" as one of twelve major policy
issues requiring resolution by the Congress.102 And in 1972, Senator Henry
M. Jackson, along with fifteen cosponsors, introduced S. 1846 to establish a
Coal Gasification Development Corporation. The proposal was opposed by
the administration and no final action was taken.'0
In his 1975 State of the Union Message, President Ford recognized the
need for a national synthetic fuels program. The chief executive proposed a
national synthetic fuels commercialization program capable by 1985 of pro-
ducing the equivalent of one million barrels of oil per day.'0 4
By 1979 greater energy independence had become a generally accepted
national goal among government and business leaders.' 5 The abundance of
United States coal resources coupled with the relative scarcity and rising
prices of domestic oil and natural gas focused attention on efforts to increase
utilization of coal resources. With respect to coal gasification, if industry
were offered favorable-in terms of their requirements-economic incen-
tives, such as a pricing decision that required consumers to share in project
risks of massive loan guarantees, commercial production levels by 1990 have
been projected at a possible 250 to 300 million cubic feet of high-BTU gas
per day. This level of production might be reached if two projects, each pro-
ducing about 125 million cubic feet per day, were commercialized.' 06
Federal involvement is considered necessary to stimulate a large-scale
synfuels industry in the foreseeable future. Synfuels are perceived by the
market as being uneconomic. However, the market does not consider
enhanced national security; the federal government must.'07 Numerous pro-
cesses for medium- and low-BTU gas synthesis are proven and thus pose little
risk for American investors. Over the next five to ten years, cooperative pro-
grams between industry and the Department of Energy (DOE) may establish
the potential market readiness of several advanced gas systems.' 00
The nation is heavily and increasingly dependent on imported fuels,
especially liquid products. One of the reasons domestic demand for
petroleum exceeds domestic production relates to the reduction of sulfur
emissions required by the Clean Air Act of 1967 and subsequent amend-
ments. 00 Conversion to low-sulfur oil and even cleaner natural gas was one
means by which to comply with emission standards, although it was not the
2 Id. at 127.
203 Id.
104 Id.
"0I Grundy, Impact of Environmental Policies On Outlook for Coal Utilization in the
United States, COAL CONVERSION, supra note 16, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Grundy].
,' SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 4.
107 Id. at 8.
101 Id. at 2.
10 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. §§
1857 et seq.; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-98, 91 Stat. 685, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401 et seq. [hereinafter cited as Clean Air Act].
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only one. However, it significantly increased the demand for petroleum. 10
Public utilities were ordered by the federal government to shift from coal-
fired electric power generators to alternative energy forms, including gas and
oil."' Nearly 29 thousand megawatts (MW) of coal-fired electric power
generation capacity was converted to oil during 1965-72.' 12 The objective of
the initial policy was to reduce air pollution.
In 1974 the government mandated a reversal. Congress passed the
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act (ESECA)'' shortly
after the OPEC oil embargo. ESECA authorized the Federal Energy Admin-
istration (FEA) to order power plants and other "major fuel burning installa-
tions" to substitute coal for oil or gas as their boiler fuel. ' 4 The objective of
the policy reversal was to reduce United States dependence on foreign sup-
plies of crude oil and to reserve dwindling domestic gas supplies for what was
deemed to be higher priority uses.'" A Federal Power Commission study in
the early 1970's reported that 398 major power plants had been converted
from coal to oil."16 The ESECA program originally targeted on serving
orders to 32 power plants."' As of December, 1976, 74 conversion orders
had been issued by the FEA to electric utilities to convert from oil to coal.I"
By mid-1977, of the 74 conversion orders issued by FEA, only 15 had received
approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)," ' only 3 plants
had been converted, and 51 orders had been stayed pending the installation
of pollution control equipment.
2
1
Most oil-fired boilers, which have never burned coal, cannot be con-
verted to coal, but rather must be replaced, with the aggregate replacement
costs estimated at $45 billion.' 2 ' The capital cost involved in complying with
first one policy and then with the other is not known precisely, but it is large
and it is a social cost to the nation. The private costs are borne primarily by
consumers and secondarily by taxpayers. 2
ESECA was not particularly effective, primarily because of environ-
"Io J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF COAL DEVELOPMENT:
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS 1, 2 (1978).
... W. MEAD, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICT IN PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MEAD].
112 NOYES, supra note 56, at 14.
'" Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 15
U.S.C. § 791 [hereinafter cited as ESECA].
114 Id.
".. MEAD, supra note 111, at 20.
"16 ENERGY CRISIS, supra note 59, at 54.
"' C. MANN & J. HELLER, COAL AND PROFITABILITY 13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MANN
& HELLER].
"' NOYES, supra note 56, at 17.
"' STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 84.
121 NOYES, supra note 56, at 17.
2 Grundy, supra note 105, at 17.
122 MEAD, supra note 111, at 20.
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mental regulations.' It has now expired and has been superseded by the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA).1"'
The congressional declaration of policy and purpose of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) recognized the need to make the nation
self-sufficient in energy.' 2 ' Under ERA, the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) vas established. 2 ' The administrator of the
ERDA was granted certain powers (including authorization to make loans)
for the conduct of research and development and related activities deemed
pertinent to the expansion of knowledge in energy matters.' Functions
vested in ithe ERDA were subsequently transferred to the Secretary of Energy
and the [Department of Energy (DOE).' 2
In the congressional statement of findings of the Federal Non-nuclear
Energy Research and Development Act (FERDA) of 1974,"" it was recog-
nized that a shortage of environmentally acceptable forms of energy
existed."', Congress found that the energy shortage was compounded by the
lack of a comprehensive and aggressive research and development program
relating to domestic energy resources."' The requirement for the nation to
undertake a research, development, and demonstration program in non-
nuclear energy technologies with a total federal investment of $20 billion or
more over the next decade (1974-1984) was identified."' The congressional
intent that such a program be developed within socially and environmentally
acceptable means was expressed in several provisions of the Act."'
Through FERDA Congress directed the development of a comprehen-
sive plan for energy research, development, and demonstration designed to
achieve solutions to short-term (early 1980s), mid-term (1980s to 2000), and
long-term (beyond 2000) energy supply systems and associated environmental
problems.' 3 A program designed to implement such a plan was directed to
include such elements and activities as: "to accelerate the commercial
demonstration of technologies for producing substitutes for natural gas, in-
cluding coal gasification."' To carry out the stated objectives of the Act,
123 SrOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 84.
"I Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289,
42 U.S.C. § 8301 et seq. [hereinafter cited as PIFUA].
"I Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. §§
5801 et seq.
126 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 5811.
.27 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 5817.
"I Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 42 U.S.C. §§
7101 et seq. [hereinafter cited as DOE].
"I Federal Non-nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-577, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901 et seq.
,30 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 5901(a).
13 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 5901(b).
132 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 5901(c).
13 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901(e), 5902(a), 5905(a), and 5919 (Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 19, as
added by Pub. L. 95-238, tit. II, § 207(b), Feb. 25, 1978, 92 Stat. 61).
." 42 U.S.C. § 5905(a).
" 42 U.S.C. § 5905(b)(3)(D).
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the kinds of activities authorized for federal assistance and participation in-
cluded: (1) joint federal-industry experimental, demonstration, or commer-
cial corporations; (2) federal purchases or guaranteed price of the products
of demonstration plants or activities; and (3) federal loans to nonfederal enti-
ties conducting demonstrations of new technologies. 36 In 1978, Congress
added sections providing for federal loan guarantees and commitments for
alternative fuel demonstration facilities to assure adequate federal support
for such programs.' 37 The guarantees are to be awarded to demonstration-
scale facilities, not full commercial ventures; and they can be for as much as
75 percent of the project cost.' 38 This law also provided continued funding
for the research, development, and demonstration of synfuels. 39 The func-
tions of FERDA were subsequently transferred to and vested in the Secretary
of Energy and the DOE.
40
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978's4 is designed to
encourage the use of coal or other alternative fuel instead of oil or natural
gas in both existing and new utility and industrial boilers. The Act prohibits
new units from burning oil or natural gas as a primary fuel. Existing
powerplants or industrial facilities that are coal-capable may be required to
convert to coal or an alternative fuel where DOE finds that it is technically
and financially feasible. Existing non-coal-capable units may be required to
burn mixtures of oil and alternative fuels. However, new and existing units
may be granted exemptions from these requirements on the basis of environ-
mental regulations, cost, site limitations, system reliability, or the public
interest. 
14 2
PIFUA revised the 1975 Energy Supply and Environmental Coordina-
tion Act,"4 which mandated coal use in large industrial boilers. The purpose
of the recent legislation is to insure that, when technically feasible and
economically practical, large boilers at industrial plants must be designed to
burn coal as a primary fuel. Under the ESECA program, the burden of proof
for determining whether an industrial plant would have to use coal rested
with the government. DOE had to identify each plant,'14 whether it was an
existing plant originally designed to burn coal that could be reconverted or a
plant on the drawing boards. The PIFUA program shifts the burden of proof
for new units from DOE to individual companies. If it is not practical for
coal to be used, each company must apply for an exemption and convince
DOE that it should be allowed to use oil or gas. Exemptions provided within
,, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5906(a)(1), (4), and & (5).
'" 42 U.S.C. § 5906(a), and 5919 (Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 19, as added by Pub. L.
95-238, tit. II, § 207(b), Feb. 25, 1978, 92 Stat. 61).
"I SYmNric Fu Ls FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 188.
139 Id.
140 DOE, supra note 128, 42 U.S.C. § 7151.
4' PIFUA, supra note 124.
,42 STEAM COAL, supra note 71, at 104.
' ESECA, supra note 113.
"' Id. at 15 U.S.C. §§ 792(a)-792(c) (1976).
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the Act may, in practice, enable industries to avoid coal use. For example, if
a company can show that it is precluded from using coal by environmental
regulations, it will be exempted from the program. The company will have to
convince DOE that there is no technology available to control emissions from
the coal-fired boiler to the extent needed to obtain an EPA permit.",4
The "environmental requirements" exemptions' 4 of PIFUA appear to
be mandatory: "the Secretary shall... ." However, the amount of documen-
tation and the actions that must be taken by an applicant to secure that
exemption are staggering and, as a practical matter, will substantially under-
cut the availability of an exemption based upon environmental
requirements.' 47 The time involved in preparation of the request, when com-
bined with the delays involved in obtaining approval from EPA, make the
procedure incompatible with good industrial planning.'
48
One of the exemptions granted to PIFUA pertains to the use of syn-
thetic fuels.' 49 A user may be given a temporary exemption to the fuel pro-
hibitions if it can prove to the Economic Regulatory Administration of DOE
that the user intends to burn synthetic fuels as they become available. To
qualify, the user must demonstrate that alternate fuels cannot be used before
the end of the exemption period and that the plant will be capable of burning
synthetic fuels at the end of the temporary exemption.'" The synthetic fuel
exemption of PIFUA also requires a "binding contract" which causes dif-
ficulties for all parties. Utilities are reluctant to sign a contract for a yet-to-
be-developed fuel at an unknown price."' It has also been suggested that in
today's marketplace, there is no ready supplier of synthetic fuels who is will-
ing to sign a contract for specific quantities of such fuels at a commercially
competitive: price." 2 In addition, signing a "binding contract" with a sup-
plier who currently has no such fuel has been a definite stumbling block in
making the synthetic fuel exemption workable."1
3
Another exemption to PIFUA is provided for those cases in which the
capital and fuel costs of using coal substantially (the word "substantially" is
not yet defined) exceed the cost of using oil."14 This is designed to exempt the
hardship cases, those in which, because of the location of the plant or some
other factor, coal would be extremely expensive to use."'
,4' MANN & HELLER, supra note 117, at 31.
'" PIFUA, supra note 124, at §§ 211(a)(3), 212(a)(1)(c), 311(a)(3), and 312(a)(I)(c).
,,' Stelphens & Curtin, The Relationship of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
of 1978 to Various Environmental Statutes, COAL CONVERSIONS, supra note 16, at 84.
"I Schuch, Industrial Planning Under FUA, COAL CONVERSION, supra note 16, at 204.
,,9 PIFUA, supra note 124, §§ 211(b), 311(b).
,s SYNrHETIc FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 189.
,' Zeltmann, The Impact of the Fuel Use Act on the Use of Combustion Turbines, COAL
CONVERSION, supra note 16, at 250.
2,2 Id. at 256.
,' Id. at 258.
'" PIFUA, supra note 124, §§ 211(a)(1), 212(a), 311(a)(1).
"I MANN & HELLER, supra note 117, at 32.
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One commentary on PIFUA suggested: "very few oil-fired plants are
on order and the law is so riddled with exemptions that it may accomplish lit-
tle more than to delay new oil-fired units for utilities that attempt to wade
through the regulatory morass. "156
Senator Henry M. Jackson introduced S. 1308-the Energy Supply
Act-on June 11, 1979.'5" S. 1308 addressed a number of factors that effec-
tively restrict commercialization of synthetics by the private sector, such as
(1) legislative and regulatory uncertainties; (2) financial uncertainty (syn-
thetics are inherently capital intensive; investors also may be unwilling to
provide capital because of the uncertain legislative and regulatory environ-
ment); (3) technological uncertainties (substantial uncertainties remain about
commercial-scale operations); and (4) timing uncertainties (abnormally long
lead-times complicated by delays in approvals, environmental reviews, and
litigation). S. 1308 became Title I of S. 932, now the Energy Security Act." 8
The Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources declared the pur-
pose of the Energy Security Act is to put synthetic fuels into perspective for
our national energy future. 5 9
The production of significant amounts of synthetic fuel by the 1990s
presents a task that is massive and complex in nature. Recognition of that
situation led to the proposal that a new financing institution-the Synthetic
Fuels Corporation-be established to undertake the responsibility of admin-
istering the federal financial assistance necessary to encourage the deploy-
ment of large-scale synthetic fuels plants. 60
The Energy Security Act of 1980,61 approved June 30, 1980, estab-
lished a $20 billion 62 synthetic fuels development program to be adminis-
tered by a federal Synthetic Fuels Corporation. 63 A national goal was
established to achieve a synthetic fuel production capability equivalent to
500,000 barrels per day of crude oil by 1987 and 2 million barrels per day by
1992, from domestic resources.
6
To promote synfuels development, 65 the corporation is required to
solicit proposals for synthetic fuel projects 66 and to provide financial
assistance for the construction and operation of synthetic fuel projects. 67
Financial assistance to private firms is to be made available in the
116 Id. at 14.
" S. REp. 96-387, supra note 100, at 154.
3 Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 [hereinafter cited as
ESA].
"' S. REP. 96-387, supra note 100, at 129.
110 Id. at 131.
"I ESA, supra note 158.
,,1 Id. § 151(a).
163 Id. § 115(a).
* 164 Id. § 125.
I Id. § 126(a)(1).
161 Id. § 127(a)(1).




following forms 68: (1) price guarantees, purchase agreements, or loan
guarantees; (2) loans, and (3) joint ventures. Preference is to be given pro-
posals by qualified firms that represent the least federal financial commit-
ment and lowest unit production cost within a particular technology.", 9
Once established, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation is expected to pro-
vide the evidence of financial capability, decision-making flexibility, and con-
tinuity of purpose needed to make the synthetic fuels program a reality. 1'"
VII. Economic and Environmental Aspects
The emerging synfuels industry faces many constraints and must over-
come many hurdles before it can significantly contribute to the nation's
energy supply. The growth of this industry is expected to proceed slowly
because its economic feasibility must still be established, technological ad-
vances must still be accomplished, environmental and regulatory uncertain-
ties must still be addressed, and basic energy policy questions remain
unanswered.'
Economic
It appears that a synfuels industry will not develop in the United States
before 1990 if market forces continue to operate as they do now. However,
continued large increases in the price of world oil could shorten this pro-
jected time for market entry.' The principal obstacle to the commercializa-
tion of synthetic fuels is the scale of the capital required. The estimated an-
nual capital requirements are $4.7 billion in 1985, $23.2 billion in 1990, and
$79.1 billion in the year 2000. Compared to estimates of nonresidential fixed
investments projected in 1978 dollars, the average annual investment required
for all synfuel plants represents 0.2% of that total amount in 1985 and 1.2%
in 1990.'1" The economy as a whole has been characterized as well able to
provide the investment capital needed.' 71 In any case, the natural gas industry
now spends more than $2 billion a year for production and transmission con-
struction alone, indicating that the synfuels capital is not out of line with
traditional expenditures. 17S
Low-BTU gas requires the least amount of capital investment of any
gasification technology and is the most promising of the group. It is the most
energy efficient (75% efficiency) of the conversion technologies and, unlike
high- and medium-BTU gas, may be produced economically in a small faci-
lity. Such a facility could serve a single industrial plant.1 6
161 Id. §§ 131(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
1.. Id. § 131(b)(2)(A).
"7 S. REp. 96-387, supra note 100, at 131.
... SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 3.
172 Id. at 7.
"7 S. REP. 96-387, supra note 100, at 143.
'14 SYi'jETic FUELs FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 7.
'7 S. REP. 96-387, supra note 100, at 143.
171 NA NN & HELLER, supra note 117, at 48.
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The short-term economic outlook for high-BTU coal gas appears to be
quite unfavorable. In 1978 the estimated cost of producing the gas ranged
from $3 to $5 per million BTU, which was 50% to 150% above prevailing
prices." Over the last five years, construction estimates for a major synfuels
complex have accelerated about five or sixfold.'"" The estimated cost for a
high-BTU gas plant producing the equivalent of 43,000 bbl/day of oil is
estimated to be almost $1.5 billion.' Any company making such an invest-
ment would have to be in the energy business and would probably seek
federal loan or market guarantees to reduce the risk.
DOE has estimated that production of high-BTU gas by the year 2000
could range from the equivalent of 130,000 to 370,000 bbl/day of oil.' 80 This
would require three to eight plants at a capital investment of $5 billion to $12
billion.'"' The United States presently has more than $100 billion invested in
its gas transmission, distribution, and end-user equipment system. On an
economic basis, keeping these gas pipelines full, even with higher priced syn-
thetics, and extension of the useful life of present pipeline systems, is cheaper
for the American consumer than creating new systems.'", Moreover, the
capital required to produce and deliver a unit of energy in the form of syn-
thetic natural gas from coal is less than that required to produce and deliver
electricity from coal.
8 3
The long-term economic outlook for synfuels development is marked
by much uncertainty. The world supply and price of conventional fuels re-
mains uncertain. The ability to market synfuels products is also uncertain.
The costs of environmental control technology to ensure acceptability of pro-
cessing technology is unknown. Long-term capital and operating costs cannot
yet be completely specified because environmental, health, and safety regula-
tions have not yet been finalized. 8 " So long as costs of coal gasification re-
main above the current market price of natural gas, it is not considered a
commercially feasible process under normal circumstances. At some future
time, however, the world price of oil and gas is expected to increase to the
point where the coal conversion processes could be feasible.8 5
Environmental
The environmental argument for production of synfuels is equivocal.
On the one hand, a synfuels plant is potentially an environmentally dirty
plant. However, commercialization of synfuels plants may permit environ-
" U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY/FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM., NATIONAL GAS
SURVEY-REPORT BY THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON SYNTHESIZED GASEOUS
HYDROCARBON FUELS (1978) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL GAS SURVEY].
278 SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 37.
MANN & HELLER, supra note 117, at 50.
280 NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, supra note 177.
"' MANN & HELLER, supra note 117, at 50.
"0 S. REP. 96-387, supra note 100, at 134-35.
"' Id.
"' SYNTHETIC FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 37.
... COAL As AN ENERGY RESOURCE, supra note 82, at 267.
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mentally clean fuels to be produced, distributed, and used in areas now
experiencing difficulties in meeting clean air standards. Furthermore, a
strategy in which pollution is concentrated and controlled at specific sites, as
is possible at a synfuels plant, might be an acceptable alternative to one in
which, through coal-burning powerplants, low levels of pollutants are
distributed over wide areas.' 8 6 However, environmental requirements clearly
represent a significant constraint on greater coal utilization in the United
States.' 87 The production and use of coal-derived synfuels will emit sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide, hydrocarbons, and particulates.'"
The Clean Air Act'89 regulates emissions and ambient concentrations of all
these pollutants, except carbon dioxide." 0 The Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978 requires the use of coal and other alternate fuels to be
consistent with applicable environmental requirements.' 9 ' Federal Clean Air
Act policies serve as an environmental imperative in the United States. Such
policies supersede national policies to effect greater coal utilization even
where air pollution control policies are more stringent than necessary to pro-
tect public health and welfare.' 92
The new Energy Security Act requires the development and implemen-
tation of a plan for monitoring the environmental and health-related emis-
sions from the construction and operation of synfuels projects receiving
financial assistance through the program.' 9 This monitoring of emis-
sions-gaseous, liquid, or solid-and the examination of waste problems,
worker health issues, and other research efforts is expected to help
characterize and identify areas of concern and develop an information base
for the mitigation of problems associated with the replication of synthetic
fuel projects."' Within three years of the initial operation of each construc-
tion project, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation must publish a report providing
detailed information on the results of the monitoring program, as well as
product price competitiveness and the social and economic impacts of the pro-
ject on local communities.' 9
At least one potential hazard of burning coal (and other fossil fuels as
well)-the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere-could have
worldwide implications. Carbon dioxide absorbs infrared radiation and
prevents its escape from the atmosphere. In 1977 the National Academy of
Sciences warned in a report that a warming of the earth's atmospheric
temperature due to the "greenhouse effect" from increased carbon dioxide
386 SYITI'rrIc FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 4.
", Grundy, supra note 105, at 21.
"' 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. Rxv. 391, supra note 7, at 398.
,' Clean Air Act, supra note 109.
4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 391, supra note 7, at 399.
"I PIt7UJA, supra note 124, at § 102(a).
,92 Gnidy, supra note 105, at 30.
,91 ESA, supra note 158, at §§ 131(e) and 143(b).
194 House Conf. Rep. No. 96-1104 in S. RP. 96-387, supra note 100, at 213.
"I ESA, supra note 158, at § 144.
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emissions might pose a severe, long-term global threat. 9 6 Massive, long-term
climatic changes, including the melting of polar icecaps and the shifting of
agriculture zones, have been suggested as major consequences. The
"greenhouse" issue remains unresolved, having divided even the members of
the National Academy of Sciences.
97
In general, conversion and combustion of coal-based synfuels produce
fewer emissions than combustion of solid fuel using fuel-gas desulfurization.
Emissions at the conversion stage are more than offset by reduced emissions
at the combustion stage. 98 For use of a given quantity of coal, total emis-
sions are 60%Vo lower for low-BTU gas and 70% lower for high-BTU gas, and
emissions at combustion fall 85% for low-BTU gas and hearly 100% for
high-BTU gas.199 Conversion of coal into synthetic fuels also redistributes the
environmental impacts of coal use. Much of the solid waste and many of the
pollutants in coal are removed in the conversion process.2 0 0 Waste is thus
transferred from the largely urban areas that consume energy to the rural
areas where coal is mined and synthetic fuels are likely to be produced. 20 '
Conversion of coal into synthetic gas is thus, in some cases, superior to direct
combustion.
20 2
A major resource constraint to the production of synthetic fuels in an
environmentally acceptable manner will be the large quantities of water need-
ed for all coal conversion processes for steam production, sulfur removal,
and the like. Water requirements for fuel quantities comparable to the fuel
requirements of a 1,000 MW electric power plant is 30 billion to 200 billion
litres per day.203 In addition to the physical water needs of synthetic fuel pro-
duction, there are certain institutional barriers to the use of water for this
purpose, including state laws, Indian water rights, and federal reserved water
rights
°.20
In the interest of efficient resource allocation, an eventual reconcilia-
tion appears needed in the United States between national energy policies (as
reflected in the National Energy Plan) and national environmental policies,
such as those in the Clean Air Act.20 5 Despite the serious polluting potential,
if properly controlled, synfuels plants offer the opportunity for being less en-
vironmentally destructive than other forms of energy production. Studies
suggest that not only do synfuels plants yield an environmentally acceptable
product, but they produce traditional pollutants in smaller amounts than do
large coal-burning power plants, oil refineries, and the like.
2 0 6
196 STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 92-93.
A WARNING ON SYNFUELS, CO2 AND THE WEATHER, 205 Sci. 376-77 (1979).
lO, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. Rv. 391, supra note 7, at 399.
199 Id.
20 Id. at 394.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 STEAM COAL, supra note 71, at 90-91.
114 SYNTHETic FUELS FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 6.
20, Grundy, supra note 105, at 32.
206 SYNTHETIC FuELs FROM COAL, supra note 2, at 5.
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VIII. Synfuels Projects-Encounters With Frustration
Great Plains Gasification Associates (Great Plains), a partnership, was
formed to construct a facility for the manufacture of synthetic gas from coal
in Mercer County, North Dakota." ' The proposed plant was designed to
produce an average of 125,000 Mcf (1 Mcf is 1,000 cubic feet) of synthetic
gas per day when fully operational, with construction costs estimated to
exceed $1 billion. 0
The original proposal for the plant was filed in March, 1975. Adminis-
trative hearings on the proposal had been substantially completed in
November, 1976, when a request Was filed for a deferred ruling on the pro-
posa. 209 Federal loan guarantees on which the applicants had counted to pro-
vide essential support for the debt portion of the project's financing had not
been approved by Congress. An additional sponsor of the program was ob-
tained, but amended applications filed in 1977 continued to assume the
availability of federal loan guarantees. 10 Faced with an unpromising outlook
for such guarantees, the applicants once again declared the need to substan-
tially restructure their proposal because of inadequate financing.2"' At the
suggestion of DOE officials, additional sponsors were brought into the pro-
ject to form a consortium and a ratepayer financing scheme was developed to
provide consumer credit support against the risks of project failure and to
otherwise contribute to the financial stability of the project. '12 The proposal
was also changed to justify the project before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) as a demonstration project designed to test the
technical, environmental, and economic feasibility of a coal gasification
plant rather than as a gas supply project.2"'
The administrative law judge, in rejection of the financing proposal,
stated:
There may well be a national need to get on with efforts to
develop a coal gasification technology, but the costs have to be borne
by America's taxpayers, not some of its ratepayers. After all, whatever
benefits are to be derived from this project will be shared by the entire
country ..... learning whether or not it is practicable to manufacture
and market coal gas would inure to the nation as a whole.2 '
The requested certificate of public convenience and necessity was denied. '"
207 Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, No. 80-1303,
at 5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 1980).
208 Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
110 Id. at 8.
2,, Id.
"I d. at 9.
213 If
214 Id. at 10.
215 Id.
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On November 21, 1979, FERC reversed the decision of its adminis-
trative law judge, approved the applicants' financing plan with minor
modifications, and granted the requested certificate." ' The FERC stated that
its decision was based on an evaluation of the specific component elements of
the project as well as the greater significance of the potential importance of
the project in evaluating the feasibility of converting the nation's abundant
coal reserves into pipeline quality gas.2"7 FERC based jurisdiction for its ac-
tion on provisions of the Natural Gas Act.2"'
The appeals court ruled that FERC exceeded its statutory authority
because it attempted to create a financing package for the construction of a
commercial-size coal gasification plant which was beyond the purpose of its
rate setting and certificating powers. 19 The court also noted that Congress
had recently given explicit authority to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to
provide various types of financial assistance to private synthetic fuel
projects. 20 In its conclusion, the court noted the "urgency which underlies
our country's strivings to achieve energy self-sufficiency and also recognized
that promotion of coal gasification might serve that goal. ' '221 However, the
FERC order was set aside and the case was remanded to the commission for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
222
Great Plains' unsuccessful attempt to secure the required certificate of
public convenience covered a period of five years and nine months.
Two projects, one known as Wesco and the other as ConPaso, repre-
sent efforts to mine massive amounts of coal from the Navajo Indian Reser-
vation in the northwest corner of New Mexico, to gasify the coal into high-
BTU gas, and then to feed it into nearby gas pipelines. Both projects involve
the participation of a gas company, and both plan to use the proven Lurgi
gasification process. The projects were delayed indefinitely because of
regulatory decisions, inflation, lack of water access, difficult negotiations
with the Navajo Indian Tribe, and other problems.223
The Kaiparowits project aptly delineates what proponents of synfuels
facilities may expect to encounter. The proposal to build a 5,000-megawatt
coal-fired power plant224 in Utah was abandoned after the participants had
spent more than twelve years and roughly $22 million on the effort.225
Estimated cost of the plant in 1965 was $500 million.226 When plans were
21 Id. at 11.
217 Id. at 12.
211 Id. at 25. The Natural Gas Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 717.
2" Id. at 31.
220 Id. at 35.
221 Id. at 42.
222 Id.
22 STOBAUGH & YERGIN, supra note 6, at 100.
224 COAL As AN ENFeaY REsOURCE, supra note 82, at 111.
22, Id. at 113.
220 Id. at 110.
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